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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, 
v. 
MARK L. PEBLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030966-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a) (West 2004), 
entered upon a conditional guilty plea in the Second Judicial District, Weber County, the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue. Although police may have acted illegally when they looked through 
defendant's garage windows, was the subsequent search lawful, where defendant gave 
consent and where no nexus existed between any police illegality and the consent? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court "review[s] the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using 
a clearly erroneous standard." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133, 1135 
(quotations and citations omitted). The court "review[s] the trial court's conclusions of 
law based on these findings for correctness." Id. The Court reviews the application of 
the law to the facts non-deferentially. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,f 15, P.3d 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision is relevant to this appeal: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8( 1 )(a)(iii) (West 2004). R. 1-4. Defendant moved to suppress evidence found 
in a search of his home and garage. R. 19-25. Following an evidentiary hearing and 
argument on the matter, the trial court denied the motion. R. 45-48, 109 (transcript of 
ruling on motion to suppress), 110 (transcript of motion to suppress). 
Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. R. 57, 
59, 62-67, 111 (transcript of plea hearing). The trial court sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years. R. 68. Defendant timely appealed. 
R. 84. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 2, 2002, Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) officer Blake 
Woodring and a colleague "received information from a confidential informant that [] 
defendant was operating a methamphetamine laboratory in his garage behind his house, 
and if they were to go there promptly, they would catch him cooking meth in his garage 
in violation of his probation." R. 109:2. In fact, defendant's probation, apparently in 
connection with an earlier narcotics-related conviction, had terminated about ten days 
earlier. R. 110:45 (parole officer's testimony); cf. id. at 10 (police officer's testimony). 
The probation officers therefore asked Ogden City police officer Jeff Machielson, 
an agent for the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force, and a county deputy to 
accompany them to defendant's home. Id.; see also R. 110:22. The officers, expecting to 
find defendant in his open garage, drove to his residence to conduct an investigation. R. 
109:5. 
Upon arrival, the officers found the home partially enclosed by a chain link fence, 
but open to permit access through the driveway. R. 109:5. A "no trespassing" sign was 
posted on the property, that, while plainly visible, was not large or conspicuous.1 Id. at 3, 
5. The officers testified that they did not see it. R. 109:3; 110:15. The garage was 
located behind the home and visible from the street. R. 109:2-3; 110:16. Both the garage 
door, which provided access for vehicles, and a side "man door" (the service door), 
The former occupant of the premises had posted this sign sometime before he 
sold the property to defendant. R. 110:4-6. 
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which provided access for people on foot, were visible from the street. R. 110:13, 16; 
Defense Exhibit 2 (diagram). The officers could see from the street that the garage's 
vehicle door was closed. R: 110:16-17. 
The entry. Having been told by the confidential informant that defendant was at 
that very moment in the garage, Machielson and Woodring did not initially approach the 
front door of the home, but walked through the open driveway entrance and down the 
driveway that led to the garage. R. 110:16-18, 46. The other officers, one a county 
deputy and the other an AP&P agent, remained at the top of the driveway. Id. at 22. 
Woodring testified, "We walked down the driveway to where the garage was 
because that's where we anticipated he was going to be based on the information we had 
received." Id. at 46. Machielson gave additional reasons for the attempt to contact 
defendant at the garage. He testified that he normally contacts suspects by knocking on 
the front door. Id. at 17. He explained, however, that he responded differently in this 
case because he had been given information that the suspect was currently operating a 
methamphetamine laboratory in the garage. Id. at 18. He stated that he did not go to the 
front door of the home because he did not want someone in the garage to flee ("if 
somebody was in the garage at that time and you went to the front door, they may not still 
be in the garage") and for safety reasons (he didn't want "to knock on the front door and 
have somebody run out the back" and "an operating methamphetamine lab . . . ha[s] 
chemical exposure, fire,. . . suspects [who] could possibly be armed"). Id. at 20. 
Machielson and Woodring approached the closed garage, but could hear no 
activity inside. Id. at 18. While it appeared that no one was there, they walked to the 
4 
garage's service door and knocked twice to see if they could get a response. Id, at 21. 
They did not. Id. Asked if the garage had any windows, Machielson testified that there 
was a window next to the service door. Id. Asked whether he looked into the window, 
he stated, "I glanced past it and you can't really see anything in it." Asked the same 
questions, Woodring stated that he could not remember looking in the garage window, 
but "[i]t seem[ed] like we probably would have looked in if there w[ere] windows there 
to try and get someone's attention because we believed he was back there." Id. at 49. 
The encounter with defendant. Finding no one in the garage, the officers began 
walking back toward the front door, hoping to contact defendant in his home. Id. At that 
moment, defendant pulled into the driveway. Id. The four officers approached 
defendant's truck. Id. at 23. Machielson unholstered his weapon and "held it at his side." 
R. 109:3; 110:24,31. Machielson asked defendant to get out of the truck. R. 110:31. 
When defendant stepped out without a weapon in his hand, Machielson reholstered his 
weapon. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Machielson then asked permission to conduct a "pat-
down," and defendant agreed. R. 110:24. Defendant put his hands on the bed of the 
truck, and Machielson patted him down for weapons. Id. Machielson found none. Id. 
Machielson spoke briefly with defendant, telling defendant that he had received "a 
report that [defendant] was cooking dope in his garage." Id. at 24-25. Defendant said 
that he was not. Id. at 25. This conversation lasted about five to ten minutes and was 
cordial. R. 109:3. 
The consent to search. Machielson then asked defendant if the officers could go 
into the garage to make certain there was no lab there. R. 110:25-26. Machielson and the 
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other officers made no promises or threats or other show offeree. R. 109:3, 110:26. 
Defendant gave his permission. R. 109:3; 110:25. He indicated that the garage was 
locked, explained that the keys were in his vehicle, and allowed Machielson to retrieve 
the keys from the truck ignition. R. 110:25. Before entering the garage, Machielson 
asked defendant whether there were any chemicals or other hazardous materials in the 
garage. Id. Defendant said there were not. Id. Defendant then volunteered that "there 
[was] some dope in the desk drawer inside." Id. 
The officers found a bag of methamphetamine in the drawer. Id. at 27. The 
officers then asked for permission to search the house, and defendant gave permission. 
R. 109:4; 110:27-28. Again, the officers made no threats or promises. R. 110:28. This 
search produced a glass pipe used for ingesting methamphetamine. R. 109:4, 110:27. 
The motion to suppress and evidentiary hearing. Following the preliminary 
hearing, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from his home and 
garage. R. 19. He claimed that the officers unlawfully entered the curtilage of his 
property and unlawfully searched his garage in his absence. R. 21-22. The officers 
"trespassed on his property, and unlawfully looked into the windows of his garage." 
R. 23 As a consequence, he argued, "all of their perceptions, from any of their senses, 
must be suppressed." R. 22. 
He also claimed that his consent to the search of his garage was involuntary. He 
alleged that when he "came home and caught the [officers] in their unlawful behavior, 
they confronted him with their unsupported allegations and told him that if [he] didn't let 
them search, he would be going to jail." R. 23. He argued that this was a "coercive set of 
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circumstances." R. 24. He further claimed that his consent, even if voluntary, was a 
result of "the officers' unlawful behavior." Id. For these reasons, he claimed that 
evidence seized in the subsequent search of his garage and home was illegally obtained 
and should be suppressed. R. 25 
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant further asserted that the officers' purpose for 
entering onto his property was to catch him operating a methamphetamine lab. 
R. 110:69-70. He also claimed that the allegedly illegal entry and unlawful garage 
window observations, together with Machielson's unholstering a weapon and conducting 
a pat-down, coerced him into giving consent. Id. at 71-72. 
The ruling on the motion. Addressing defendant's illegal entry claim, the trial 
court found that the officers entered the property to conduct an investigation. R. 109:5. 
The court held that the officers acted lawfully when they entered onto the property and 
approached the garage door, believing that defendant, the property owner, was in the 
garage and not in the house. Id. The court held that Machielson acted unlawfully and in 
violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when he peered into the garage 
window. Id. The court held, however, that this illegality did not vitiate the defendant's 
subsequent consent to search because there was "no legal nexus between looking in the 
window and the subsequent consent. The officers used nothing in that illegality to 
exploit against the defendant to obtain the consent." Id. at 5-6. 
Addressing defendant's conversation with police in the driveway, the court 
observed that "the officers conducted a level-one citizen police encounter; namely, one in 
which the defendant consents to police questioning." Id. at 5-6. The court found that 
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"[t]he earlier drawn weapon had been holstered and the pat-down was for weapons only. 
A calm, cordial conversation occurred after those events." Id. at 6. 
The court found that defendant "gave consent to the search of home and garage." 
Id. The court also found that "[t]he officers made no claim of improper authority to 
search," "exhibited no force at the time of securing consent," and "employed no 
deception or trick." Id. "They merely made a request to search and the defendant 
cooperated and consented." Id. Looking at the "totality of circumstances," the court 
concluded that defendant gave his consent voluntarily. Id. 
Finally, the court held that defendant's consent did not result from the exploitation 
of any prior police illegality. Id. at 6. The court held that Machielson's looking into the 
garage window violated defendant's expectation of privacy. Id. The court found, 
however, no evidence "that the defendant even was aware of the police illegality." Id. at 
7. The court therefore found that defendant "ha[d] no reason to be concerned when he 
voluntarily g[ave] consent." Id. Further the court found that the officers saw nothing and 
"used nothing in that illegality to exploit against the defendant to obtain the consent." Id. 
at 6-7. Based on these findings, the court concluded that there was "no legal nexus 
between looking in the window and the subsequent consent." Id. at 6. "[C]onsent was 
not obtained by exploitation of the prior illegality; that is, . . . the connection between the 
consent and the prior illegality was sufficiently attenuated that excluding the evidence 
would have no deterrent effect." Id. at 7-8. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly concluded that defendant voluntarily consented to a 
search. While an officer briefly unholstered his weapon as defendant pulled into the 
driveway, he reholstered it after defendant exited the truck without a weapon. Defendant 
consented to a weapons pat-down, which produced no weapon. Following a five or ten 
minute "cordial conversation" defendant consented to a search of his garage and home. 
Defendant cooperated with police by volunteering the location of the garage keys and the 
location of a bag of methamphetamine in the garage. Defendant's will was not 
overborne. 
2. Defendant's consent was not obtained by exploitation of a prior illegality. 
First, the officers lawfully entered upon the curtilage, and consent to search was therefore 
not the result of an illegal entry. The curtilage of a dwelling is only semi-private. Open 
access ways, like the driveway, extend an implied invitation for entry by the public. 
Police officers violate no expectation of privacy by entering upon an open driveway or 
path. 
Second, although the officers may have looked into the garage windows 
unlawfully, they learned nothing that motivated their request for consent to search. 
Further, defendant did not know the officers had looked through the windows. In any 
case, no evidence could have been seen through the windows. The officers therefore 
could not have exploited the illegality to obtain consent. 
Finally, this Court should decline to address defendant's claim that consent to 
search resulted from an illegal seizure because it is not adequately briefed. Defendant 
9 
claims that police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify their seizing him in the driveway. 
Defendant, however, has not addressed, let alone challenged the trial court's conclusion 
that the driveway incident was a level-one encounter, not a seizure. A level one 
encounter does not require reasonable suspicion. 
In any case, police conduct was lawful. The trial court correctly determined that 
the driveway exchange was a level-one encounter, not a seizure. Even if a seizure 
occurred, it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Further, even assuming both that a 
seizure occurred and that reasonable suspicion was lacking, the connection between the 
illegal seizure and the consent was nevertheless sufficiently attenuated so as not to 
invalidate the search. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH 
OF HIS GARAGE AND HOUSE; OFFICERS EXPLOITED NO 
PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO OBTAIN CONSENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to suppress 
evidence found in his garage and house after he consented to a police search. Defendant 
claims that his consent to search was not voluntarily given and that police obtained his 
consent by exploitation of a prior illegality. Br. Appellant at 17. He claims that the 
police illegally entered onto the curtilage of his home, illegally looked through the garage 
windows, and illegally seized him. Id. at 12, 14, 21. He relies on these alleged 
illegalities to support his exploitation claim. 
Consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Bisner, 
2001 UT 99, % 43, 37 P.3d 1073. "A consent is valid only if '(1) [t]he consent was given 
voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^  47, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)). The trial court properly found that defendant gave 
consent voluntarily and that the police did not obtain consent by exploitation of a prior 
illegality. R. 109:5, 7-8. 
A, Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his garage and house. 
"Before a court addresses whether consent was voluntary, it must first determine 
that there was consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f 48. Based on the officers' 
uncontroverted, credible testimony that they asked permission to search the garage and 
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home and that defendant gave permission, the trial court found that defendant gave 
consent. R. 109:6; 110:25, 50. Defendant has not challenged that finding on appeal. 
In assessing voluntariness, a court must determine whether "a person's will [has 
been] overborne." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at f^ 57. "The appropriate standard to 
determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of proof 
is by preponderance of the evidence." Id. at f 56. "The totality of the circumstances 
must show consent was given without duress or coercion." Id. at |^ 57. 
These factors "may show a lack of duress or coercion": "(1) the absence of a 
claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by 
the officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner . . . ; and (5) the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." Id. (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
Applying those factors, the trial court concluded that consent was given without 
duress or coercion. As found by the trial court, "[t]he officers made no claim of improper 
authority to search," "exhibited no force at the time of securing consent," and "employed 
no deception or trick." R. 109:6. "They merely made a request to search and the 
defendant cooperated and consented." Id. The trial court ruled correctly. 
While the presence of four officers is a factor that might in some circumstances 
suggest duress, here the officers' conduct was not threatening. Moreover, while an 
officer's use of a weapon might in many circumstances cause duress, here the only use of 
a weapon was clearly a precautionary and not a threatening act. Only one officer 
unholstered his weapon, and he merely held it to his side as a precaution until defendant 
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exited his vehicle. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Once defendant stepped out of his truck and the 
officer saw that defendant was unarmed, the officer put it away. Id. Nothing in the 
record indicates that defendant saw the weapon during the brief time it was unholstered. 
Cf. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at 149 (concluding that show offeree directed at son as he 
exited house did not coerce mother who remained inside). 
Under some circumstances, a pat-down might suggest duress. But, in this case, 
although an officer patted defendant down for weapons, he did so only after requesting 
and receiving permission to do so. R. 110:24. The officer did not indicate or imply that 
defendant was required to submit to the pat-down. Id. 
Finally, a "cordial conversation" lasting about ten minutes intervened between the 
pat-down and the request to search. R. 109:3-4. As defendant conceded in his brief, the 
officers "assumed a less intimidating posture, [as they] questioned [him] about his drug 
use and the 'tip' that he was manufacturing methamphetamine." Br. Appellant at 15. 
When asked for permission to search, defendant not only consented, but cooperated, 
volunteering both the location of the key required to open the garage and the location of 
the methamphetamine in a drawer inside the garage. R. 109:3-4, 110:25. See Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, at \ 58 (concluding that defendant, who had been illegally detained, 
voluntarily consented to search, and observing that (1) officer asked permission, used no 
threat, and employed no deception and (2) defendant cooperated in the search). 
Applying a "totality of circumstances" test, the trial court properly concluded that 
defendant gave his consent voluntarily. R. 109:6. Factors showing the "lack of duress" 
included (1) "the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers," (2) "the 
13 
absence of an exhibition offeree by the officers" at the time they requested permission, 
(3) "a mere request to search," (4) "cooperation by the owner" in volunteering 
information, and (5) "the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer[s]." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at % 57. 
B. Consent was not obtained through the exploitation of a prior illegality. 
Consent obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality, even if voluntarily 
given, is not valid. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^  61. "Whether a person's consent was 
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is ultimately a legal conclusion 
reviewed for correctness." Id. 
The threshold inquiry of any exploitation claim is whether police acted unlawfully. 
Where police have acted lawfully, exploitation of a prior illegality cannot occur. See 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at f^ 53. If an illegality has occurred, the court must determine 
"[w]hether a person's consent was obtained by police exploitation of [the] prior 
illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 61. The court "'evaluates the relationship between 
official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if excluding the 
evidence will effectively deter future illegalities.'" Id. at % 62 (quoting State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995)). 
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1. Police entry onto the curtilage did not constitute an illegal search. Assuming 
that officers illegally looked through the garage windows, there was no nexus 
or "causal connection" between that illegality and the consent to search and 
no exploitation of the illegality to obtain consent. 
a. Police entry onto the curtilage did not constitute an illegal search. 
Defendant argues that the officers acted illegally when they entered onto his 
property, walked down the driveway, and knocked on the garage doors. Br. Appellant at 
10, 12-14. Defendant claims that these acts constituted an unreasonable search of the 
"curtilage" surrounding his home. Id. Defendant's claim fails because a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the curtilage does not extend to objects in plain view from the 
access ways within the curtilage. 
Certain lands adjacent to a dwelling may be included in its curtilage, i.e., within 
the yard or other property included in the fence surrounding the dwelling. See Merriam-
Webster 's Unabridged Dictionary (2000). But entry upon the curtilage does not 
necessarily constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. Some portions of the curtilage are 
only semi-private. See Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 505 (3d 
edition 1996) & cases cited therein. "People commonly have different expectations, 
whether considered or not, for the access areas of their premises than they do for more 
secluded areas." State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (Or. App. 1973). "[W]hen the 
police come on to private property to conduct an investigation or for some other 
legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go 
(e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), observations made from such vantage points are 
not covered by the Fourth Amendment." LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 
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506-08. For instance, one might expect "various members of the public to enter upon [] a 
driveway, e.g., brush salesmen, newspaper boys, postmen, Girl Scout cookie sellers, 
distressed motorists, neighbors, friends." Corbett, 516 P.2d at 490. Any of them could 
"be reasonably expected to report observations of criminal activity to the police.55 Id. "If 
one has a reasonable expectation that various members of society may enter the property 
in their personal or business pursuits, he should find it equally likely that the police will 
do so.55 Id. 
"For an officer to look at what is in open view from a position lawfully accessible 
to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable expectancy of privacy.55 State 
v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709, 711 
(Utah 1981) (plurality opinion) (observing that expectation of privacy does not extend to 
objects in plain view from access ways within the curtilage, as they "offer[] an implied 
permission to the public to enter5' and holding that owner/occupant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in marijuana plants observable from driveway leading to the 
house). 
Here, the officers entered onto the curtilage via a driveway that was lawfully 
accessible to the public. The driveway, which was not obstructed by fencing, led to the 
garage's main vehicle door. R. 110:13-14; Defense Exhibits 1-5 (pictures and diagram of 
property). The officers, in approaching the main garage door, violated no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in walking upon an access way that a neighbor, believing 
defendant to be in his garage and wanting to borrow a lawn or garden tool, might have 
used. 
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Further, the officers violated no reasonable expectation of privacy when, upon 
receiving no response to their knock on the vehicle door, they followed the cement path 
around the corner to the service door and knocked on it, further attempting to contact 
defendant. R. 110:18, 48; Defense Exhibit 4. Again, the officers were on an access way 
that a neighbor might have used to contact defendant. While the officers came onto 
private property to conduct their investigation, they "restricted] their movements to 
places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches),'5 and any 
"observations [they might have] made from such vantage points are not covered by the 
Fourth Amendment." LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 506-08. 
Moreover, the officers had a legitimate purpose for being on the access way. 
Defendant alleges that they entered "for the sole purpose of searching therein." Br. 
Appellant at 14. As the trial court found, however, the officers did not enter the driveway 
to conduct a search, but to contact defendant in the course of an investigation. R. 109:5. 
While the purpose of the investigation was to determine whether defendant was operating 
a methamphetamine laboratory and while the officers may have expected to catch 
defendant making methamphetamine, nothing suggested that the officers intended to 
conduct an illegal search. R. 109:5; 110:10,45-46,48. 
Defendant also argues that "the police officers were trespassers," which, in 
addition to their entry onto the curtilage of his property, violated his "expectation of 
privacy." Br. Appellant at 14. The trial court properly ruled that the presence of the "no 
trespassing" sign had limited significance. The court stated, "[T]he prohibition against 
trespassing is not absolute under the law. It only precludes nonlegal business or casual 
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visitors." R. 109:5. The court concluded that the police officers "ha[d] a qualified 
privilege to enter on the premises to conduct a police investigation by asking questions." 
Id. 
These conclusions are consistent with Utah law. The relevant statutory provisions 
defining the elements of criminal trespass and the defenses to prosecution are these: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if,... 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another; [or] 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on 
property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with 
apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; 
or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of 
intruders; 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; 
and 
(b) actor rs conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner rs use of 
the property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) & (4) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
Nothing in the record suggests that the police knew or should have known that 
their presence could be unlawful, defendant's driveway was open to the public, and the 
police did not interfere with defendant's use of the property. 
Even assuming that the officers had trespassed, the trespass would not, of itself, 
demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation. In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
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712-13 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed the significance of a trespass: "The 
existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the 
Fourth Amendment has been violated,... for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 [parallel citations] (1967) (no trespass, but Fourth Amendment violation) with Oliver 
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 [parallel citations](1984) (trespass, but no Fourth 
Amendment violation).55 
In sum, the police entry upon the curtilage was lawful. It violated no reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Because police acted lawfully, they committed no illegality and 
therefore could not have exploited such an illegality. 
b. There was no nexus or "causal connection" between the allegedly illegal 
window search and defendant's consent. 
Defendant also claims, and the trial court found, that the investigating officers 
conducted an illegal search when they looked through the garage windows. Br. 
Appellant at 10; R. 109:5-6. But even assuming the window observations constituted an 
illegal search, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because the police 
2
 Without any analysis, defendant argues that under the Utah Constitution "a 
police officer that trespasses onto private property has no authority at all to stop any 
person, let alone a 'right of investigation.55' Br. Appellant at 16. This Court should 
decline to address defendant's state constitutional claim because it was not argued below 
and is inadequately briefed on appeal. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
3
 If the officers left the access ways to look through the windows, they may have 
violated defendant's expectation of privacy. The officers did not testify that they left the 
access ways to look through the windows. Defense Exhibit 4, a picture of the garage, 
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did not exploit that illegality to obtain defendant's consent to search. R. 109:4. The trial 
court correctly concluded there was no connection between the officers' window 
observations and defendant's subsequent consent to their search of his garage and home. 
R. 109:6. 
"[T]he mere fact of an unauthorized or illegal search does not, ipso facto, make 
evidence obtained in a subsequent search of the same premises . . . the fruit of the prior 
illegal search." Cornelius v. Superior Court of Kern County, 102 Cal.Rptr. 59, 63 (Cal. 
App. 1972). Rather, "[t]here must be a nexus, clearly perceivable, between the first 
search and evidence seized in the second search." Id. Absent a causal connection, a 
defendant's "consent [could not have been] obtained by police exploitation of [the] prior 
illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 62; see also United States v. Robinson, 932 F. 
Supp 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 1996). 
Where officers conduct a search pursuant to consent, the consensual search is 
permissible unless some nexus exists between a prior illegality and the consent. For 
instance, a nexus may exist where a prior illegal search gave the police a reason to seek 
consent. See State v. Doyle, 63 P.3d 1253, 1257 (Or. App. 2003). A nexus may exist 
where a prior illegal search caused the defendant to give consent. See United States v. 
Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1985); LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), 
at 663 & n. 125. But where the prior illegal search gave officers no reason to seek 
however, shows the windows located at some distance from the service door. See 
Defense Exhibit 4, photograph H, inside manila envelope included in record. 
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consent and where it did not affect a defendant's decision to give consent, no nexus exists 
between the prior illegality and the evidence discovered in a subsequent consent search. 
In other words, determining whether evidence is fruit of a Fourth Amendment 
violation presupposes that there is a "causal connection" between the evidence and the 
illegality See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (noting that the 
exclusionary rule bars evidence "come at by exploitation of [the] illegality"). "Where 
there is no causal connection in the first instance, [exploitation] analysis is inapposite." 
Robinson, 932 F. Supp at 1278 . 
In this case, assuming that the police conducted an illegal search when they looked 
through the garage windows, that search had no connection to defendant's later consent 
to the subsequent garage and house search. The search, if illegal, was not the reason for 
the officers' presence on the property when defendant returned. They came onto 
defendant's property to locate defendant as part of an investigation, and they were still 
attempting to find defendant when he drove up. R. 109:5. As found by the trial court, 
police saw no incriminating evidence when they looked into the garage window and, 
indeed, no incriminating evidence could have been seen. R. 109:6-7; 110:25. The police 
did not obtain or use any evidence from the search or the fact of the search itself to 
extract consent. R. 109:5-6. Defendant, in fact, was unaware of the search and would 
have had no reason for concern even if he had been aware. R. 109:7-8. 
Thus, there was no "nexus" between the window search and defendant's consent. 
Absent a causal connection, defendant's "consent [could not have been] obtained by 
police exploitation of [the] prior illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at ^ 61. 
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c. Even if a nexus existed between the alleged window search and defendant's 
consent, the connection was sufficiently attenuated so as not to invalidate the 
search. 
Even where some connection exists between a prior illegality and a person's 
consent, consent is not obtained by exploitation of that illegality and a consent search is 
not invalid where "the connection between the prior illegality and [the] consent [is] 
sufficiently attenuated." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. When police obtain evidence 
pursuant to a voluntary "consent to search that follows on the heels of a Fourth 
Amendment violation," the Court must determine whether that consent "was independent 
of the violation to such a degree as to cause a 'break in the chain of events sufficient to 
refute the inference that the evidence was the product of the constitutional violation.'" 
State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, \ 23 n.8, 92 P.3d 167 (quoting United States v. Vega, 
221 F.3d 789, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (brackets in Earl omitted). In making that 
determination the Court considers three factors: "(1) the purpose and flagrancy of the 
illegal conduct, (2) the presence or intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal 
proximity between the illegal [conduct] and consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at fflf 64-69 
(citing Brown v. Illinois, All U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)) (quotation omitted). "Where the 
[police] misconduct is extreme, [the Court] require[s] a clean break in the chain of events 
between the misconduct and the consent to find the consent valid." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1264. On the other hand, "where it appears that the illegality arose as the result of 
negligence, the lapse of time between the misconduct and the consent and the presence of 
intervening events become less critical to the dissipation of the taint." Id. 
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A review of the facts of this case in light of these three factors supports the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress. 
Purpose andflagrancy of the illegal conduct Where the purpose of the illegal 
conduct is to obtain consent, suppressing the evidence derived from that conduct will 
"'clearly have a deterrent effect.'" Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 65 (quoting Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1264). Here, however, the officers did not look into the garage windows for the 
purpose of discovering evidence they could use to obtain consent. Rather, they merely 
looked in the window to try to locate defendant as part of their attempt to conduct an 
investigation. R. 110:21, 49 ("It seems like we probably would have looked in if there 
[were] windows there to try and get someone's attention because we believed [defendant] 
was back there."). Therefore, any police conduct was not extreme. 
Intervening circumstances. Moreover, significant circumstances had intervened 
between the officers' window observations and the consent. The officers, who had 
learned nothing by looking in the windows, had left the garage and were on the driveway 
at the side of the house when defendant pulled up. R. 109:3, 110:22, 49. Because they 
had left the garage area, defendant did not know that they had looked into the garage. 
R. 109:7. These intervening circumstances purged any taint of a prior illegal search. Had 
defendant been aware of the prior search and had he believed that the police already had 
incriminating evidence, he may have felt that he no longer had a reason to withhold 
consent, and his consent may have been the fruit of an illegal search. That, however, was 
not case. 
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While defendant now suggests that he was aware of the officers' search, the 
evidentiary hearing produced no testimony to support that assertion.4 See Br. Appellant 
at 7, 15. As found by the trial court, the officers were in the driveway when defendant 
returned and "there was no evidence that the defendant even was aware of the police 
illegality." R. 109:7. In addition, "there [wa]s no evidence that any evidence seized 
could have been seen . . . by looking in the window, so the defendant ha[d] no reason to 
be concerned when he voluntarily g[ave] consent." Id. In other words, defendant, who 
knew what was in the garage, would have had no reason to worry even if he had known 
that the officers had looked through the windows.5 Finally, as found by the court, the 
police learned nothing during the window observations and used nothing from the 
window observations to obtain consent.6 R. 109:5-6. The officers, in fact, possessed all 
the information that motivated their request for consent before they entered onto 
defendant's property. 
Defendant could have presented evidence at the suppression hearing without 
waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 
at \ 50 (noting the "significance" of defendant's failure to testify at the suppression 
hearing and consequent failure to rebut the officer's testimony that defendant consented 
to the search). 
5
 Police later obtained defendant's consent to search the garage. R. 109:3; 110:25. 
The only contraband discovered was inside a desk drawer. R. 110:27. Defendant knew 
that methamphetamine, while present in the garage, was in the drawer and not visible 
through the garage windows. R. 110:25. 
6
 Defendant has not challenged these trial court's findings. Further, he has made 
no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then show why the 
findings are clearly erroneous. When an appellant fails to meet the "heavy burden" of 
marshaling the evidence, the appellate court will assume that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court. Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431. 
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Temporal proximity. "A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation 
and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not 
had time to dissipate." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at If 69 (quotation omitted). The time 
lapse is, however, "less critical to the dissipation of taint" where police misconduct is not 
extreme. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. 
As explained in the foregoing analysis, police conduct here was not extreme. 
Moreover, the time lapse was sufficient to provide a window during which police officers 
left the garage area, defendant returned home, and the officers and defendant conversed 
cordially for five to ten minutes. This is not a case where "the lapse of time was 
negligible." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 69 (suppressing evidence where officers asked 
consent "[d]irectly after" illegally detaining a defendant). 
Based on these facts, the trial court properly found that the "evidence 'was [not] 
come at by exploitation of [the window observations] illegality,'" but by "'means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" Segura v. United States, 
468 U.S. 796, 804-805 (1984) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). The connection 
between the illegality and the evidence obtained was "sufficiently attenuated so as not to 
invalidate the search." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. Therefore, the "deterrent effect of 
suppressing evidence obtained" would not "justif[y] its cost." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at ^ 
70. The evidence obtained pursuant to the consent search was not "fruit of the poisonous 
tree," and the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
488 (1963). 
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2. Defendant's seizure claim is not adequately briefed. In any event, the 
driveway exchange did not constitute an illegal search or seizure. Even 
assuming that an illegal seizure occurred, consent to search did not result 
from exploitation of the illegality. 
Defendant next claims that consent to search the garage and home was obtained by 
exploitation of a prior illegal seizure. Br. Appellant at 18. He asserts that he was seized 
when Officer Machielson ordered him from his vehicle and forced a pat-down search. Id. 
at 15. Defendant argues that the seizure was unreasonable because officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure. Id. at 14, 17. 
a. Defendant has not challenged the trial court's determination that the 
driveway incident was a level-one consensual encounter, not a seizure. 
Defendant's claim that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion is therefore 
irrelevant and his exploitation claim is inadequately briefed 
Defendant's claim that the officers lack reasonable suspicion to speak with him in 
the driveway presupposes a seizure. The trial court concluded that the driveway incident 
was "a level-one citizen police encounter/' not a seizure. R. 109:5-6. Defendant has not 
challenged that determination. 
Inadequate briefing. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998). Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that the argument in the 
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record 
relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The rule "requires not just bald citation to authority 
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority. [The] 
court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument 
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and research:' Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379, f 20, 80 P.3d 546 
(citing Thomas, 962 P.2d at 305) (emphasis in Spencer) (ellipsis omitted). 
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's determination that the driveway 
incident was a level-one consensual encounter, not a seizure. R. 109:5-6. A consensual 
encounter does not require reasonable suspicion. Defendant's claim that the officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion is therefore irrelevant; and his exploitation claim, which is 
predicated upon an unreasonable and illegal driveway seizure, is inadequately briefed. 
This Court should therefore decline to address it. 
Failure to marshal and allegation of unsupported facts. Moreover, by positing 
his own version of the facts relevant to the driveway incident, defendant has challenged 
the trial court's factual findings without complying with the marshaling requirement. 
'To comply with the marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all the favorable 
evidence at the point at which they challenge the factual finding," that is, in the argument 
section at the point addressing the issue. See Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84,147 n.l 1, 
54 P.3d 1119 (emphasis in original) (citing Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 
(Utah App. 1987)). 
In making his argument, defendant does not cite to the record. Rather, he asserts 
without citation the following version of the facts: 
The officers went into [defendant's] backyard specifically to see if 
they could 'catch' him manufacturing methamphetamine in his garage. The 
peered through the window of his garage and seeing nothing incriminating 
started to leave. As they did, [defendant] arrived home. Noting that the 
officers were in his backyard, [defendant] stayed in his automobile as the 
officers approached him. 
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When three officers arrived at [his] car, one of them drew his 
weapon, keeping it pointed at the ground. The other two ordered [him] 
from his vehicle and 'spread him out' on the hood of the car. They then 
conducted a search of [his] person without his consent. The reason given 
for this was that the officers knew that [he] had recently cleared parole. 
After searching [him] and finding no weapons, the officers assumed a less 
intimidating posture, but questioned [him] about his drug use and the 'tip' 
that he was manufacturing methamphetamine. 
Br. Appellant at 15. 
This version of the facts is neither consistent with the trial court's findings nor 
supported by the record. As found by the trial court, the officers had left the garage, 
which was located behind the house, and were "walk[ing] down the driveway . . . along 
the side of the house" when "defendant drove up in his vehicle." R. 109:3. As defendant 
pulled into the driveway, one officer did, as a precaution, unholster his weapon and hold 
it at his side. Id. The officer reholstered the weapon before he asked to perform the 
pat-down. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Moreover, the officer did not order defendant from his 
vehicle or "spread him out" on the hood of his car or search him without his consent. 
The State has located only one record entry on the question of whether defendant 
was ordered out of his vehicle. Officer Machielson, who testified that he briefly 
unholstered his weapon and kept it at his side, testified that he "asked [defendant] to get 
out of the vehicle." R. 110:31. Thus, he testified to a request, not an order. Further, the 
officer immediately reholstered the weapon when defendant exited the vehicle without a 
weapon in his hand. R. 109:3; 110:24, 31. Nothing in the record suggests that defendant 
ever saw the weapon while it was unholstered. 
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Further, the officers did not search or pat-down defendant without his consent. As 
the trial court found, "After the defendant exited his [truck] without a weapon in his 
hand, the officer holstered his weapon." R. 109:3. "The officers briefly explained their 
purpose and asked permission to pat the defendant for a concealed weapon." Id. That 
finding is not clearly erroneous. Moreover, Officer Machielson gave uncontroverted 
testimony that defendant, in fact, gave consent. R. 110:24. Defendant's assertion that the 
officers patted him down without his consent is inconsistent with the trial court's findings 
and inconsistent with the uncontroverted testimony given at the suppression hearing. See 
R. 109:5-6, R. 110:24. 
Finally, defendant mischaracterizes the officers' conduct during the pat-down. 
Defendant was not "'spread . . . out' on the hood of the car." Br. Appellant at 15. 
Rather, the officer had defendant place his hands on the bed of his truck during the pat-
down. R. 110:24. 
Thus, defendant's failure to adequately analyze the facts of this case in light of the 
law is compounded by his failure to marshal the facts relevant to his claim and by his 
allegation of facts inconsistent with the trial court's findings and unsupported in the 
record. This Court should therefore decline to address his claim. 
b. The driveway exchange did not constitute an illegal search or seizure. 
In any event, defendant's claim fails on the merits. Br. Appellant at 14-17. The 
driveway exchange was lawful. The incident was a level one consensual encounter, not a 
seizure. Moreover, even if a seizure occurred, it was supported by reasonable suspicion. 
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Consensual encounter. "A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement 
official is a consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive 
questioning by an officer." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 34. "Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
In contrast, "[a] level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive." Id. at f^ 35. The United States Supreme 
Court has explained that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave." United 
States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
Seizure is marked by police use "of physical force or a show of authority" such 
that the person's "freedom of movement is restrained." Id. at 553. "Examples of 
circumstances that might indicate a seizure . . . would be the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person . . . , or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer's request might be compelled." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 
1996) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). 
But "police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment 
violation. While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, 
and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the 
consensual nature of the response." INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). "Unless 
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the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable 
person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot 
say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
A reasonable person in defendant's position would have believed that he was "free 
to disregard the police and go about his business." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 
(1991) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the officers met defendant in his driveway, 
asked his permission to conduct a pat-down search, and conducted the search. R. 109:3-
10. Defendant agreed to a pat-down search which produced no weapon. Id. Following 
the pat-down, a cordial conversation ensued. Id. This conduct would not have suggested 
to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave. 
While an officer had briefly unholstered his weapon when defendant drove into 
the driveway, he reholstered it immediately when defendant exited his vehicle unarmed. 
R. 110:24. Nothing suggests that defendant saw the weapon. Further, an officer's 
request to conduct a pat-down does not constitute a seizure and does not communicate 
that a defendant is not free to leave. See United States v. Archeval-Vega, 883 F. Supp 
904, 910 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that request to conduct a pat-down search "was 
not so coercive as to communicate to the Defendant that he was not free to leave"); State 
v. West, 459 S.E.2d 55, 58 (N.C. App. 1995) (stating that "questioning and request to 
frisk do not constitute a seizure"); State v. Crawford, 786 N.E.2d 83, 85-86 (Ohio App. 
2003) (holding that request to perform a pat-down did not constitute a seizure). 
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Under these circumstances, a reasonable person may have felt the normal 
inclination to cooperate with police, but he would nevertheless have believed that he was 
free to go about his business. Thus, no seizure occurred. 
Reasonable suspicion. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant was seized, the 
seizure was reasonable and therefore legal. Where officers have a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous, officers may conduct a weapons search. 
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968). When an officer is investigating a minor 
crime, "there must be particular facts which lead the officer to believe that a suspect is 
armed." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 32, P.3d (quoting State v. Warren, 2001 
UT App 346, \ 15, 37 P.3d 270) (internal quotation omitted) (in turn citing LaFave, 4 
Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 255-56). However, where the underlying nature of the 
crime is itself sufficient to "trigger the officer's reasonable suspicion" that a suspect may 
be armed, the officer may frisk the suspect without additional evidence that the suspect is 
armed. Brake, 2004 UT 95 at If 32. Operating a methamphetamine laboratory is such a 
crime. See State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997) (noting that "officer 
could reasonably assume individuals suspected of participating in moving large quantities 
of illegal drugs . . . may be armed") (citing State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring)); LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 256 
(including as sufficient underlying crimes "robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, 
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics") (emphasis added); R. 110:20 
(officer testifying that "operating a meth lab" presents circumstances where "suspects 
could possibly be armed"). 
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Therefore, even assuming that defendant was seized when officers conducted the 
weapons pat-down, the seizure was reasonable and legal. Thus, it was not a prior 
illegality, and defendant's subsequent consent to search could not have been the fruit of 
such a prior illegality. 
c. Even assuming that an illegal seizure occurred, consent to search did not 
result from exploitation of the illegality. 
Even assuming that the pat-down constituted an unlawful seizure, defendant's 
consent was not the result of that illegality. "[A] person is 'seized' only when, by means 
of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553; accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. A seizure may "de-
escalate to a consensual encounter. Since a consensual encounter is not a seizure, 
questioning during such an encounter is lawful, regardless of scope, as long as the person 
remains a willing participant." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 27. A seizure "de-escalates to 
a consensual encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter and depart." Id. at \ 39. 
Here, following the pat-down search, the officers and defendant engaged in a 
cordial conversation in which the officers conveyed the purpose for their investigation 
and defendant responded that the tip was inaccurate. R. 109:3. Following that five-to-
ten-minute conversation, officers asked defendant for permission to search his garage. 
Id. Defendant not only consented, but also volunteered information about where to locate 
the garage key and where to look for drugs inside the garage. R. 109:3-4; 110:25. 
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Defendant was no longer seized when he gave consent. Moreover, even if 
defendant had been illegally seized during the pat-down, the seizure was not a flagrant 
illegality. The officers did not seize him to force his consent, but to insure their own 
safety. R. 110:20, 31. Police learned nothing while conducting the pat-down that led 
them to request permission to search. Therefore, suppressing the evidence obtained 
pursuant to defendant's consent, simply because the police took precautions to protect 
themselves, would not have a deterrent effect on future illegal behavior. 
Moreover, police officers did not seek consent to search immediately upon 
completion of the pat-down. Rather, a cordial conversation lasting five to ten minutes 
intervened between the pat-down and the request to search. R. 109:3; 110:24-25. Under 
these circumstances, defendant did not assent to the search because of any duress or 
coercion he may have felt during the pat-down. The cordial conversation that intervened 
between the pat-down and the request to search dissipated any atmosphere offeree and 
coercion, and defendant had time to decide whether he wanted to cooperate with police or 
not. 
In sum, consent was not "'come at by exploitation of [any prior] illegality," but 
"by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of [any] primary taint." Segura, 468 
U.S. at 804-05 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). The trial court therefore properly 
concluded that "suppressing the evidence obtained" would not "justif[y] its cost." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f 70. 
34 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
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